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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY OR A
RATIONAL BASIS FOR INCONSISTENCY? THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PRELITIGATION SCREENING PANEL FINDINGS
BEFORE AND AFTER SMITH v. HAWTHORNE I AND II
Matthew Asnault Morris*

I. INTRODUCTION
Prelitigation screening panels have been instrumental in streamlining medical
malpractice litigation in the State of Maine by culling claims from superior court
dockets, encouraging settlements, and providing findings of fact that could prove
useful for a jury if the case proceeds to trial. In enacting one particular provision
governing the confidentiality and the admissibility of the screening panel process,1
however, the legislature may have sacrificed the constitutional rights of medical
malpractice claimants in favor of a lighter docket. Two recent cases before the Law
Court, Smith I and II,2 have challenged the constitutionality of Maine’s unique statutory approach to the admissibility of screening panel findings at a subsequent trial.
The legislature created a system of mandatory prelitigation screening panels in
sections 2851 through 2859 of the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) with the
express purpose of identifying those “claims of professional negligence which merit
compensation” prior to the commencement of a lawsuit, and “encourag[ing] early
withdrawal or dismissal of nonmeritorious claims.”3 Sections 2852 through 2854
outline the composition of the panel and the mandatory procedures that a claimant must
follow to commence an action for professional negligence.4 Section 2855 provides that
this panel shall hear evidence from both the claimant and the doctor accused of
professional negligence in order to make three separate findings as to the doctor’s
deviation from the standard of care, causation, and the claimant’s comparative
negligence.5 Although plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of the screening

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maine School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor
Orlando Delogu for his extremely helpful commentary, guidance, and insight throughout various working
drafts of this Note. The author would also like to thank his sister Lillian and her husband Stephen Rees
(Maine Law ’05) for all of their support.
1. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857 (West 2000).
2. Smith v. Hawthorne (Smith I), 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433; Smith v. Hawthorne (Smith II), 2007
ME 72, 924 A.2d 1051.
3. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2851(1)(A) & (B) (West 2000) (identifying the purpose of
mandatory pre-litigation screening panels); see also Sullivan v. Johnson, 628 A.2d 653, 656 (Me. 1993).
4. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2852 (West 2000).
5. Section 2855 specifies that the screening panel shall make the following findings in writing within
30 days of the hearing:
A. Whether the acts or omissions complained of constitute a deviation from the applicable
standard of care by the health care practitioner or health care provider charged with that
care;

2008]

ADMISSIBILITY OF SCREENING PANEL FINDINGS

207

panel process as outlined in these sections, the Law Court has repeatedly upheld the
constitutionality of the process as a whole and deferred to the legislative purpose to
promote pretrial resolution explicated in section 2851.6
Deference to legislative policy, however, has not been sufficient to curtail the
various constitutional challenges that malpractice claimants have raised against section
2857. This section—which addresses the admissibility of unanimous panel findings
at a subsequent trial—has been successfully challenged on various bases, and has been
subsequently amended on numerous occasions in order to strike a balance between the
constitutional rights of malpractice claimants and the legislative intent to generate disincentives for the pursuit of non-meritorious claims. The latest successful constitutional challenge to section 2857 in Smith I significantly limited the constitutional scope
of these admissibility-oriented disincentives.
Paragraph B of section 2857(1) essentially states that the screening panel’s
findings are admissible against the doctor at a later trial if the panel finds that the
doctor deviated from the applicable standard of care, and this deviation was the
proximate cause of the claimant’s injury.7 The rationale behind this rule is clear: if a
doctor unanimously loses at the screening panel stage on both the issues of breach of
duty and causation that would be required to prove malpractice at a subsequent trial,
the doctor should not be permitted to prevent the admission of all of those findings
unfavorable to his case.
Paragraph C of this statute provides that if the screening panel answers either the
question of breach of duty or causation unanimously in the doctor’s favor, then the
“findings are admissible in any subsequent court action.”8 This language is particularly
problematic because it refers to the panel findings as to “any question” (i.e. either

B. Whether the acts or omissions complained of proximately caused the injury complained
of; and
C. If negligence on the part of the health care practitioner or health care provider is found,
whether any negligence on the part of the patient was equal to or greater than the negligence
on the part of the practitioner or provider.
Id. § 2855 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
6. See Irish v. Gimbel (Irish I), 1997 ME 50, ¶¶ 14, 18, 691 A.2d 664, 672-73 (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that the panel process denies access to the courts and causes unconscionable delay, and holding
that the screening panel statute “establishes reasonable procedural requirements that do not violate the open
courts provision of the Maine Constitution”); see also Sullivan, 628 A.2d at 656 (upholding the
constitutionality of the legislative intent to encourage the pre-trial resolution of meritorious claims and to
encourage the withdrawal of non-meritorious claims).
7. Section 2857(1)(B) provides:
B. If the panel findings as to both the questions under section 2855, subsection 1,
paragraphs A and B are unanimous and unfavorable to the person accused of professional
negligence, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court action for professional
negligence against that person by the claimant based on the same set of facts upon which
the notice of claim was filed.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857(1)(B) (West 2000).
8. Section 2857(1)(C) provides:
C. If the panel findings as to any question under section 2855 are unanimous and
unfavorable to the claimant, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court action for
professional negligence against the person accused of professional negligence by the
claimant based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of claim was filed.
Id. § 2857(1)(C).
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breach of duty or causation), but then states that the findings (rather than the finding
related to either of those questions) are admissible in a subsequent trial.9 This
provision formed the basis of the constitutional challenge in Smith I.10 In the Smiths’
case, the superior court interpreted “the findings” to mean only those findings that were
favorable to the doctor at the screening panel stage; therefore, the court allowed Dr.
Hawthorne to inform the jury that the panel found no proximate causation, but the
Smiths were not permitted to inform the jury that the panel found (1) that Dr.
Hawthorne deviated from the standard of care and (2) that there was no comparative
negligence.11
The Smiths argued that section 2857 violated their fundamental right to a jury trial
by “requiring that the jury be told a half-truth.”12 The Law Court in Smith I did not go
so far as to say that section 2857 is unconstitutional as written, but did hold that the
application of the statute, which allows admission of only those findings favorable to
the doctor, deprives the jury of the meaningful information required to render a fair
verdict, and thus, deprives a malpractice claimant of his right to a jury trial guaranteed
by the Maine Constitution.13
Whereas Smith I addressed a malpractice claimant’s constitutional challenge to
section 2857’s substantive asymmetry, Smith II addresses whether the statute gives the
party who prevailed at the panel stage the right to refuse to submit all unanimous
findings.14 In a 4-2 majority opinion authored by Justice Calkins, the Law Court held
that a doctor who has prevailed at the screening panel stage with respect to either the
question of breach of duty or causation should be permitted to refuse to submit all of
the panel’s findings to the jury.15
Both Smith I and II illustrate an urgent need for the Maine Legislature to
fundamentally reevaluate the structure, constitutionality, and effectiveness of the
admissibility-oriented statutory disincentives in sections 2857 and 2858 of the MHSA.
The Maine Legislature could avoid further constitutional challenges to section 2857
without sacrificing its interest in promoting pretrial settlements by amending the
MHSA to provide (1) that all screening panel findings—unanimous and nonunanimous alike—shall be admissible at a subsequent trial, and (2) that reasonable
attorneys’ fees shall be assessed against the party who unanimously loses at the panel
stage, refuses to abandon or settle the claim, and then loses again at a subsequent trial.
Part II of this Note will outline the statutory scheme, legislative history, and case
law surrounding the screening panel process in Maine. Part III will discuss the
constitutionality of asymmetric admissibility as addressed in Smith I. Part IV will
focus on the evidentiary and constitutional questions surrounding procedural
asymmetry in Smith II. Part V will address how the Law Court should have decided
Smith II. Part VI will consider the various possibilities for legislative amendments to

9. The same ambiguity does not arise in subsection B because “the findings” clearly refers to “both”
of the unanimous panel findings unfavorable to the doctor. Id. § 2857(1)(B).
10. See generally Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433.
11. See id. ¶ 5, 892 A.2d at 435.
12. Brief of Appellant at 4, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
13. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 25, 892 A.2d at 439-40.
14. Smith II, 2007 ME 72, 924 A.2d 1051.
15. See id. ¶ 13, 924 A.2d at 1055.
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sections 2857 and 2858, and proposes amendments to these sections that are designed
to avoid future constitutional challenges and preserve the legislature’s intent to
generate incentives for settlements and the abandonment of non-meritorious claims.
II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRELITIGATION SCREENING
PANEL PROCESS IN MAINE
A. Previous Statutory Guidance as to the Admissibility of
Screening Panel Findings
In the 1970s, the United States was in the midst of a medical malpractice crisis.16
Throughout the country, the number of malpractice claims and the size of jury awards
for claimants skyrocketed, leading to a dramatic increase in doctors’ insurance
premiums.17 In response to this crisis, the American Medical Association persuaded
state legislatures to change their laws governing malpractice litigation.18 The Maine
Legislature responded in 1975 with An Act to Create a Commission to Revise the Laws
Relating to Medical and Hospital Malpractice Insurance.19 This commission was
created in order to “insure the availability of medical and hospital malpractice
insurance to physicians and hospitals throughout the State and to develop a more
equitable system of relief for malpractice claims.”20 The commission—chaired by
Justice Charles A. Pomeroy of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine—submitted the
information it collected from various hearings to the legislature in the 1977 Pomeroy
Commission Report.21 This report proposed several major changes to existing law
governing malpractice insurance and the statute of limitations for claims, and also
recommended a system of voluntary binding arbitration for malpractice claims.22 The
Pomeroy Commission’s recommendations were ultimately enacted by the legislature
as the original MHSA.23
In the mid-1980s, the United States experienced another wave of surging
malpractice awards,24 and Maine responded with a corresponding wave of legislative

16. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499, 502 (1989) (“For poorly understood reasons, the
frequency of malpractice claims, which had risen moderately through the 1960s, turned sharply upward in
the early 1970s.”); see also P. & S.L. 1975, ch. 73 (stating that the “national crisis . . . developing with
regard to the availability and cost of hospital and medical malpractice insurance” has created “an
emergency within the meaning of the Constitution of Maine”).
17. See Kathy Kendall, Comment, Latent Medical Errors and Maine’s Statute of Limitations for
Medical Malpractice: A Discussion of the Issues, 53 ME. L. REV. 589, 602 (2001); see also THE COMM’N
TO REVISE THE LAWS RELATING TO MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, REP. TO THE 108TH
LEGIS. xvi (Jan. 22, 1977) [hereinafter Pomeroy Report] (reporting that most malpractice premiums in
Maine “have at least doubled,” and that “some physicians in high-risk classification” have reported 400%
increases in their premiums).
18. See Kendall, supra note 17, at 602.
19. P. & S.L. 1975, ch. 73.
20. Id. § 1.
21. Pomeroy Report, supra note 17, at i.
22. Id.
23. P.L. 1977, ch. 492, §§ 1-3.
24. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at 503 (attributing the re-emergence of medical malpractice problems
in the 1980s to the fact that medical providers had “banded together” in order to make coverage more
available).

210

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

reform to the MHSA. In 1985, the Maine Legislature enacted An Act Relating to
Medical and Legal Professional Liability, which introduced several significant changes
to the MHSA with respect to medical malpractice screening panels.25 One of the most
significant changes was the adoption of a mandatory prelitigation screening panel
process in place of the voluntary arbitration outlined in the original MHSA.
Sections 2852 through 2856 of the 1985 Act outlined the basic structure of the
mandatory screening panel process.26 According to section 2852, the Chief Justice of
the Superior Court—after receiving a notice of claim—was to select a retired judge or
a person with judicial experience to serve as chair of the screening panel.27 Then, the
chair of the panel was instructed to choose two to three additional panel members from
a list of approved health care practitioners and attorneys.28 The panel was to consist of
one health care attorney and one or two health care practitioners who practice,
preferably, in the same field as the allegedly negligent doctor.29 Section 2853
governed the claimant’s filing requirements and specified that the screening panel
could be bypassed if both parties agreed to resolve the claim through a lawsuit.30
Section 2854 mandated the basic terms of the hearing before the screening panel,31 and
section 2855 directed the screening panel to make findings, after both sides have
presented their case, on deviation from the applicable standard of care and proximate
causation.32 Section 2856 specified that the panel findings had to be served on both
parties within seven days of the date of the findings.33 These basic parameters of the
screening process, as provided in sections 2852 through 2856, have not been amended
significantly since the 1985 Act.34
The 1985 Act also introduced section 2858, which has not once been amended and
is identical to the current version of the statute.35 Subsection 1 of section 2858
essentially provides that if the panel findings as to breach of duty and causation are
unanimous and unfavorable to the doctor, the doctor “must promptly enter into
negotiations to pay the claim or admit liability”; if a suit is brought against the doctor
under these circumstances, “the findings of the panel are admissible as provided in
section 2857.”36 If, however, either of the unanimous findings of the panel as to breach
of duty or causation is unfavorable to the claimant, subsection 2 states that “the
claimant must release the claim or claims based on the findings without payment or be
subject to the admissibility of those findings.”37

25. P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12 (effective Jan. 1, 1987).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Here, section 2854 provides that the claimant shall present the case before the panel and the
person accused of professional negligence shall make a responding presentation. It also specifies that the
Maine Rules of Evidence do not apply. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Compare P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12 with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851- 2856 (West 2000
& Supp. 2006).
35. Compare P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12 with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West 2000).
36. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West 2000).
37. Id. As plaintiff’s counsel Gilbert Greif noted during oral argument in Smith II, section 2858 “no
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Not all of the provisions in the 1985 Act remain unchanged or substantively
similar to their current statutory equivalents. Section 2857 of the 1985 Act specified
that screening panel findings are admissible—either against the doctor or the
claimant—“without explanation” at a subsequent trial:
If the findings of the panel are:
A. As to both questions under section 2855, unanimous and unfavorable to the
person accused of professional negligence, the findings, without explanation, shall be
admissible in any subsequent court action for professional negligence against that
person by the claimant based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of claim
was filed; and
B. As to either question under section 2855, unanimous and unfavorable to the
claimant, the findings, without explanation, shall be admissible in any subsequent
court action for professional negligence against the person accused of professional
negligence by the claimant based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of
claim was filed.
Under paragraphs A and B, the findings shall be admissible only against the party
against whom they were made.38

The claimants in Irish v. Gimbel I raised the first constitutional challenge to section
2857, arguing that the mandatory admissibility of the panel findings “without
explanation” violated their right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Maine Constitution.39
B. Previous Constitutional Challenges to Section 2857: Irish v. Gimbel I and II
In 1989, Russell and Laurie Irish filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr.
Gregory Gimbel on behalf of their minor child.40 The Irishes alleged that Dr. Gimbel
deviated from the applicable standard of care in his delivery of their child, and that

longer even makes sense as it’s drafted.” Audio Recording of Oral Arguments, Smith II, 2007 ME 72, 924
A.2d 1051 (Han-06-356) (on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court) [hereinafter Oral
Arguments, Smith II]. When section 2857 was amended in 1999 after the Irish I decision, the legislature
overlooked the need to make corresponding changes in section 2858. Section 2858, subsection 2, states
that if the panel findings as to either breach of duty or causation are unanimous and unfavorable to the
claimant, the claimant must “release the claim or claims . . . or be subject to the admissibility of those
findings under section 2857, subsection 1, paragraph B.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West
2000). As this statute was first introduced in the 1985 Act, section 2857, subsection 1, paragraph B
referred to the panel findings unfavorable to the claimant. See infra text accompanying note 43. The 1999
amendments moved the provision relating to unfavorable findings to paragraph C, but section 2858 was
never amended to reflect this change. See infra note 45; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858
(West 2000). The result of this legislative oversight is that the plain language of section 2858 inevitably
results in the following incoherent interpretation of the statue: if the findings of the panel are unanimous
and unfavorable to the claimant, the claimant will be subject to the admissibility of those findings that are
favorable to the claimant.
38. P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12 (effective Jan. 1, 1987). The Statement of Fact accompanying the original
bill reveals that these changes were intended to “[i]ncreas[e] the incentive not to proceed to trial after
screening, thus encouraging defendants to settle in cases where negligence and causation is found and by
encouraging plaintiffs not to proceed where the panel makes a finding against negligence and causation.”
L.D. 2400, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1986) (emphasis added).
39. Irish I, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 664, 669; see also ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“In all civil suits,
and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in cases
where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”).
40. Id. ¶ 1, 691 A.2d at 667.
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their child suffered brachial plexus palsy and audiological difficulties as a result.41 A
prelitigation screening panel was appointed, and unanimously found that Dr. Gimbel
did not deviate from the applicable standard of care.42 The Irishes then filed a notice
of claim in superior court, followed by several motions in limine challenging the
constitutionality of the screening process and seeking to either exclude the screening
panel findings or afford them less weight than other evidence.43 After these motions
were denied and the jury returned a verdict for Dr. Gimbel, the Irishes appealed to the
Law Court, contending that the “mandatory admission of unanimous findings ‘without
explanation’ prevents effective impeachment of the findings and results in juror
deception, thereby hindering the jurors’ ability to properly weigh the evidentiary
significance of the findings.”44
In assessing the constitutionality of the screening panel process, the Law Court
found that the mandatory admission of unanimous findings “without explanation”45
withheld “information that is essential to the jury’s fact-finding role”; “[t]he total
absence of information and the unexplained silence of plaintiffs’ counsel in the face
of the highly prejudicial findings invite unprincipled evaluation and can only result in
juror confusion.”46 The court explained that a jury must be given six points of information regarding the context of the screening panel process as a whole,47 including the

41. Id. ¶ 2, 691 A.2d at 667.
42. Id.
43. Id. ¶ 5, 691 A.2d at 668.
44. Id. ¶ 7, 691 A.2d at 669.
45. The original language of section 2857, applicable at the time, was similar to the current version of
the statute, but with three significant differences. First, the statute in subsections A and B provided that
the panel’s findings “shall be” admissible in any subsequent court action. P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12 (enacting
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857, effective Jan. 1, 1987). The current statute simply provides that
these findings “are” admissible. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857(1)(B)-(C) (West 2000); see also L.D.
1325, § 8 (119th Legis. 1999) (repealing section 2857 from the 1985 act). Second, the original statute
provided that the findings shall be admissible in both subsection A and B “without explanation.” P.L. 1985,
ch. 804, § 12(A)-(B). This language was removed in the wake of the Irish I decision. See L.D. 1325, §
8 (119th Legis. 1999); see also Irish I, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 11, 691 A.2d at 670. Finally, the original statute
provided that the findings in paragraphs A and B shall be admissible “only against the party against whom
they were made,” whereas the 1999 act (passed after the Irish I decision) eliminated this language entirely,
and moved paragraphs A and B to paragraphs B and C. See P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 12; see also L.D. 1325,
§ 8 (119th Legis. 1999); P.L. 1999, ch. 523, § 4 (effective Sept. 18, 1999).
46. Irish I, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 11, 691 A.2d at 670.
47. This part of the Irish I holding identified six points that should be included in both the court’s
preliminary comments and final instructions to the jury:
(1) the panel process is merely a preliminary procedural step through which malpractice
claims proceed;
(2) the panel in this case consisted of (the name and identity of the members);
(3) the panel conducts a summary hearing and is not bound by the Rules of Evidence;
(4) the hearing is not a substitute for a full trial and may or may not have included all of the
same evidence that is presented at the trial;
(5) the jury is not bound by the finding(s) and it is the jurors’ duty to reach their own
conclusions based on all of the evidence presented to them; and
(6) the panel proceedings are privileged and confidential. Consequently, the parties may not
introduce panel documents or present witnesses to testify about the panel proceedings, and
they may not comment on the panel finding(s) or proceedings except to reiterate the
information in 1 through 6.
Id. ¶ 12, 691 A.2d at 671.
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explicit instructions that the panel’s findings are not conclusive and cannot be
commented on by either party.48 However, the court refused to hold that section 2857
precludes the disclosure of constitutionally required information. The court found that
the “admission of panel findings is mandated only when the panel unanimously
determines that a plaintiff or defendant possesses a meritless claim or defense,” and
that “[p]retrial resolution is encouraged by the specter of mandatory admission of the
findings free from attack by the opposing party.”49
The Law Court remanded the case to the superior court, and the plaintiffs appealed
again, this time asserting that the admission of unanimous panel findings violated their
right to a jury trial, “to procedural and substantive due process, to equal protection of
the law, and resulted in a violation of constitutional separation of powers.”50 The Law
Court in Irish II refused to address the due process and equal protection arguments that
had already been litigated in Irish I, and dismissed the “one new issue” concerning the
separation of powers violation by finding that the six-point instruction “was necessary
not to explain or litigate the panel findings, but to prevent a jury from drawing
improper inferences.”51
C. Post-Irish I Amendments to Section 2857
In 1999—after Irish I was decided in March of 1997, but before the Irish II
decision was announced in 2000—the Maine Legislature repealed section 2857 as
enacted in 1985 and introduced a new statutory scheme that abandoned the “without
explanation” language of the previous statute:
B. If the panel findings as to both the questions under section 2855, subsection 1,
paragraphs A and B are unanimous and unfavorable to the person accused of
professional negligence, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court action
for professional negligence against that person by the claimant based on the same set
of facts upon which the notice of claim was filed.
C. If the panel findings as to any question under section 2855 are unanimous and
unfavorable to the claimant, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court
action for professional negligence against the person accused of professional
negligence by the claimant based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of
claim was filed. The findings are admissible only against the claimant.52

48. Id.
49. Id. ¶ 13, 691 A.2d at 671.
50. Irish v. Gimbel (Irish II), 2000 ME 2, ¶ 5, 743 A.2d 736, 737.
51. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 743 A.2d at 737-38.
52. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857 (1)(A)(B) (West 2000); see also L.D. 1325, § 8 (119th Legis.
1999). This bill, as it was first introduced in February 1999, included a paragraph which provided for the
admissibility of unanimous panel findings against the claimant, but contained nothing related to the
admissibility of panel findings against the person accused of professional negligence. Id. The summary
accompanying the bill made it clear that this section “prohibits the presentation to the jury of a unanimous
panel finding against the person accused of professional negligence.” Id., Summary (119th Legis. 1999).
The Judiciary Committee amendment left section 2857 unchanged. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1325, No.
S-352 (119th Legis. 1999). The legislative intent of this early draft is clear, but perhaps too conspicuously
one-sided. This omission of any provision for the admissibility of panel findings against the doctor
continued until the Senate submitted an amended version of the bill on June 2, 1999. See Sen. Amend. A
to Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1325, No. S-381 (119th Legis. 1999). The Senate amendment’s new paragraph
B provided for the admissibility of “the findings” against the person accused of professional negligence;
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The current version of section 2857 and the version of the statute at issue in Smith I
and II reflect no substantive changes from the 1999 act.53
III. SMITH V. HAWTHORNE I: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ASYMMETRIC ADMISSIBILITY
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
James Edward Smith fractured his left tibia and fibula after falling in August of
1997, and orthopedic surgeon Dr. Catherine Hawthorne treated him for the next several
months after the injury.54 On October 21, 1999, James and his wife Sheryl Smith filed
a sworn notice of claim under the MHSA55 against Dr. Hawthorne.56 They alleged
four deviations from the appropriate standard of care with respect to her treatment of
Mr. Smith: (a) an “inadequate internal fixation of the original fracture,” (b) a premature
allowance of “weight bearing on this unstable construct,” (c) inadequate treatment of
osteomyelitis57 at the fracture site, and (d) improper use of ultrasound bone stimulation.58 Mr. Smith claimed that as a result of these deviations he was forced to undergo
a series of unnecessary operations and was “significantly delayed” in his return to work
as a truck driver.59 Mr. Smith also claimed to have experienced great pain and
suffering, a permanent impairment of his foot and ankle, and a “limitation in his ability
to work and play” as a result of these deviations.60 Sheryl Smith also alleged a loss of
consortium as a result of Dr. Hawthorne’s negligent treatment of her husband.61
Pursuant to the MHSA, a pre-litigation screening panel was formed, discovery
began for both parties, and a panel hearing took place on November 30, 2000.62 The
three-member panel made a unanimous finding that the only deviation from the

however, these amendments allowed for admissibility when the panel findings “as to any question under
section 2855” are unanimous and unfavorable to the doctor, not when the panel answers both questions of
breach of duty and causation in favor of the claimant as is currently required. Id. The summary accompanying the Senate amendments states that it “adds language to retain the admissibility of all unanimous
panel findings,” but provides no further explanation for the addition of paragraph B. Id., Summary (119th
Legis. 1999). The Senate quickly submitted a newly amended version of paragraph B on June 4, 1999 to
allow the admissibility of the panel findings only if the findings as to “both” the questions of breach of duty
and causation are unanimous and unfavorable to the person accused of professional negligence. Sen.
Amend. B to Comm. Amend. A. to L.D. 1325, No. S-436 (119th Legis. 1999). The summary accompanying these final amendments to the 1999 act provides no guidance as to why this change was made. Id.,
Summary (119th Legis. 1999).
53. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857 (West 2000) with P.L. 1999, ch. 523, § 4.
54. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 1.
55. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2853 (West 2000) (specifying that a person may commence an
action for professional negligence by serving a written notice of claim on the person accused or filing a
notice of claim with the superior court).
56. Appendix at 9, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
57. Osteomyelitis is defined as an “[i]nflammation of bone caused by pyogenic (pus-producing)
organisms.” ROBERT K. AUSMAN & DEAN E. SNYDER, 3 AUSMAN & SNYDER’S MEDICAL LIBRARY § 4.92
(Lawyers ed. 1992).
58. Appendix at 10, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 13.
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applicable standard of care was Dr. Hawthorne’s treatment of the wound at the fracture
site.63 After hearing evidence presented by both Mr. Smith and Dr. Hawthorne, the
screening panel was asked to answer “yes” or “no” to the three questions mandated by
section 2855(1)(A)-(C) in its final malpractice decree.64 The panel answered “yes” to
question 1—relating to a deviation from the applicable standard of care—and “no” to
questions 2 and 3—relating to the existence of proximate causation and comparative
negligence.65
After the panel hearing, the Smiths filed suit against Dr. Hawthorne for
professional negligence in the Maine Superior Court in Hancock County.66 Prior to
trial, the Smiths filed motions in limine to (1) admit the entirety of the panel’s findings
rather than just the one finding that was favorable to Dr. Hawthorne, and (2) challenge
the constitutionality of section 2857 as violative of the plaintiffs’ rights to trial by jury,
equal protection, and due process.67 On September 6, 2002, Justice Jabar denied these
motions, ordering that the constitutional challenge must fail “because there is a rational
basis for the inconsistency” inherent in section 2857:
Very simply put, in any trial a Plaintiff must prevail on both issues, negligence and
proximate cause; whereas, the Defendant need only prevail on one of those issues.
Therefore, the Legislature’s requirement that the Plaintiff prevail on both issues
before the findings are admissible; whereas, the Defendant need only prevail on one
of the issues before the findings are admissible is rationally based on the basic
requirements of the parties in any negligence action.68

The first trial ended in a hung jury and a mistrial.69 Prior to the second trial, the
Smiths once again objected to the “partial instruction and partial admission of the prelitigation screening panel findings.”70 Justice Hjelm affirmed Justice Jabar’s order on
the first motion in limine, instructed the jury as to the screening panel process pursuant

63. Id.
64. Id. The screening panel answered the following three questions in its malpractice decree:
A. Whether the acts or admissions complained of, or found by the panel to exist, or as
agreed by the parties, constitute a deviation from the applicable standard of care by the
health care practitioner or health care provider charged with that care: regarding 7(c)
as alleged in the Notice of Claim.
B. Whether the acts or omissions complained of proximately caused the injury
complained of, or as found by the panel, or as agreed by the parties[.]
C. If negligence on the part of the health care practitioner or health care provider is found,
whether any negligence of the part of the patient was equal to or greater than the
negligence on the part of the practitioner or provider[.]
Id. (emphasis added). The italicized portion was handwritten and followed by an asterisk. The asterisk
referred to another handwritten portion on the bottom of the decree, which stated “The panel finds no
negligence on the remaining issues.” Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855(1) (A)-(C) (West
2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing the statutory basis for these three questions).
65. Appendix at 13, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
66. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 5, 892 A.2d at 435. Smith v. Hawthorne has been tried a total of three
times. The case was tried twice before the Law Court rendered its decision in Smith I, and was tried again
on remand to the Superior Court after this decision.
67. Appendix at 8, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
68. Id.
69. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 2.
70. Appendix at 16, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292).
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to Irish I, and allowed defense counsel to tell the jury that “[t]he panel in this case
unanimously concluded that the acts or omissions complained of by the Smiths were
not the legal cause of the injuries that he has alleged.”71 After both sides rested, the
jury was given a verdict form that combined the issues of negligence and causation,
asking “Was the Defendant negligent and was the Defendant’s negligence a proximate
cause of the Plaintiff James Smith’s injuries?”72 The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Dr. Hawthorne.73
The Smiths appealed this decision to the Law Court, claiming that, as applied in
this case, section 2857 violated their rights to a jury trial, equal protection, and due
process as protected by the United States and Maine Constitutions.74
B. Oral Arguments Before the Law Court
1. First Round
On January 15, 2005, attorneys for the Smiths and Dr. Hawthorne appeared before
the Law Court in what would be the first of two rounds of oral argument in Smith I.75
Counsel for the Smiths, Attorney Gilbert Greif, argued that the Maine Legislature, by
enacting section 2857, has created a procedure “unique in the nation” that “requires
that the jury be told a half-truth.”76 He argued that—despite the fact that in a medical
case the issue of negligence is more difficult to prove than proximate cause—he was
denied the opportunity to explain to the jury that the screening panel found that there
was negligence.77 Chief Justice Saufley’s questions focused on the possibility of
salvaging a constitutional interpretation of section 2857, presaging her alignment with
the Smith I dissent.78 Mr. Greif responded that the application of the statute is not
based on a shifting burden or proof, but rather represents “an attempt by the legislature

71. Id. at 24 (Partial Transcript of Proceedings).
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 28. The verdict form in the Appendix is unmarked, thus it is unclear whether the jury found
in favor of Dr. Hawthorne on the basis of the combined negligence and causation question, or on the basis
of comparative negligence. Id. at 29.
74. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 12; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; ME. CONST. art. I,
§§ 6-A, 20.
75. Audio Recording of Oral Arguments, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292) (on file
with the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court) [hereinafter 1 Oral Arguments, Smith I ].
76. Id. Maine’s statutory scheme is no longer “unique in the nation” as Mr. Greif suggested. In August
of 2005, New Hampshire enacted section 519-B:8, which is virtually identical to Maine’s screening panel
provisions. See generally N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-B:8 (West 2007).
77. 1 Oral Arguments, Smith I, supra note 75. Mr. Greif outlined the basis of his appeal as follows:
What makes the courts of our nation work is the right to confront and challenge evidence,
and the most useful piece of evidence I would have had to challenge that argument that there
was no infection, and that there was no breach of the standard of care, was that three people
had heard the same evidence . . . and had agreed with our expert that yes there was infection
and yes this infection should have been treated more promptly and more efficiently.
Id.
78. Id. Chief Justice Saufley: “In order to prevail, the plaintiff must prevail on both [negligence and
proximate cause] . . . and in order to prevail, the defendant need only rebut one . . . . Isn’t it really the
legislature just saying if you’ve carried your burden to prevail, whatever it is that got you there goes before
the . . . jury?” Id.; see also Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 36, 892 A.2d 433, 441 (Levy, J., dissenting).
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to place a thumb . . . on the scales of justice, and to tilt the proceeding irrevocably in
favor of the doctor.”79
Counsel for Dr. Hawthorne, Attorney George Schelling, attempted to distinguish
Irish I by focusing on the relief sought: whereas the remedy in Irish was to supplement
section 2857, the remedy in this case would be to “gut” the statute entirely.80 Mr.
Schelling emphasized how panel findings have been afforded less weight after Irish I,
but that the legislative intent is nevertheless clear: to give “the bottom line” to the jury
as to the screening panel findings in non-meritorious cases.81
2. Second Round
On rehearing before the Law Court, Mr. Greif emphasized that the substantive
asymmetry in this case is actually worse than the constitutional violation in Irish I.82
When Justice Calkins asked how the statute should be reconstructed, Mr. Greif
responded that he would strike all of paragraph B, and apply paragraph C to both
claimant and doctor.83 Justice Levy then asked whether it was “really within our
purview to start cutting and pasting the statute.”84 When Mr. Greif drew a parallel
between the prevention of “effective impeachment of the findings” in Irish I and the
constitutional challenge in this case, Chief Justice Saufley noted that the “court wrote
more into the statute” in the Irish I decision and remedied the constitutional defect with
the six-point instruction.85 Mr. Greif responded that the court did not write anything
more into the statute in Irish I, but simply said that a trial court “in its fundamental core

79. 1 Oral Arguments, Smith I, supra note 75. Mr. Greif asserted that even though the Smiths prevailed
on the issue of comparative negligence, the statute is written so as to preclude the submission of this finding
“under any circumstances.” Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Audio Recording of Oral Arguments, Smith I, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433 (Han-04-292) (on file
with the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court) [hereinafter 2 Oral Arguments, Smith I ]. Specifically, Mr.
Greif argued that unlike the application of paragraph C that led to substantive asymmetry in this case, the
“without comment” provision invalidated in Irish I did not always favor the doctor. Id.
83. Id. The following exchange illustrates what appears to be Justice Levy’s attack on the relief sought
by the Smiths, and Justice Alexander’s attempt to salvage the statute by reading “the findings” in paragraph
C to mean all of the unanimous findings of the screening panel:
Justice Levy: The question is do we declare it unconstitutional, and invalidate it, or do we
rewrite the statute so as to make it constitutional?
Mr. Greif: You declare the disparate treatment between B and C as being unconstitutional.
Justice Levy: Do we have a third avenue? As Justice Alexander observed, in looking at C,
it says, if the findings . . . are . . . unanimous and unfavorable to the claimant, the findings
are admissible . . . are we prevented from saying what is intended by the legislature . . . is
that when they said the findings, they meant all the findings, both the unfavorable and the
favorable findings? Do we have that flexibility anymore?
Mr. Greif: It would render the prior subparagraph B . . .
Chief Justice Saufley: We’d have to strike B.
Justice Levy: Because B prohibits that, doesn’t it?
Justice Alexander: No, you don’t have to strike B. What B says is in order for the plaintiff
to get it admitted, they have to win on everything, in order for the defendant to get it
admitted, they have to win on one thing. What’s wrong with that?
Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Irish I, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 12, 691 A.2d 664, 671.
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function” can offer the six-point instruction to the jury.86 Justice Alexander said that
Mr. Greif’s problem is with the judge’s editing of the findings, not with the plain
language of the statute.87
Attorney Schelling noted what he considered a significant flaw in the Brief for
Appellant that the screening panel “in essence” found that the Smiths’ claim was
meritorious because they prevailed on the issue of negligence; he argued that this is in
fact a non-meritorious case that “should have been weeded out according to the
Pomeroy Commission and according to the legislature.”88 He emphasized that there
is no constitutional problem when the court only gives the jury the finding that allowed
the doctor to prevail at the screening panel if it is properly instructed as to the
difference between legal cause and breach of the standard of care.89
3. Discussion
Both rounds of oral arguments in Smith I revealed several fracture points capable
of dividing the court into a 4-3 opinion, with two justices concurring. The first fracture
point is revealed through Justice Levy and Chief Justice Saufley’s line of questions to
Attorney Greif, which inquired why the court should not defer to the legislative policy
determination that a claimant must prevail on both the issues of standard of care and
causation at the panel stage in order to get those determinations before a jury. The
second fracture point is revealed through Justice Alexander’s statement in the rehearing
that the Smiths’ real objection is to the lower court’s omission of certain panel
findings, rather than to the statute itself, which can be read so as to provide for the
admission of all panel findings at a subsequent trial. The third fracture point is
revealed by Justice Levy and Chief Justice Saufley’s joint focus on the sufficiency of
the Irish I six-point instruction in contextualizing the panel findings. These three
issues raised in oral arguments prefigured the central themes of both the dissenting and
concurring opinions.
C. The Decision
The majority opinion of Justice Calkins, joined by Justices Dana, Alexander, and
Silver, held that the “application of subsections 2857(1)(B) and (C) by the Superior
Court, which denied the plaintiff’s request to admit the panel’s findings on negligence
and comparative negligence and allowed in evidence only the panel’s findings on
causation, was unconstitutional and denied the Smiths their right to a jury trial under
the Maine Constitution.”90 Quoting Irish I, the majority reiterated that the right to a
jury trial is defined by the right “to have a determination made by the jury on material

86. 2 Oral Arguments, Smith I, supra note 82.
87. Id. Justice Alexander: “The law right now says the findings are admissible; your problem is not
with the law, your problem is that the judge decided to cut and paste.” Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 25, 892 A.2d 433, 439-40; see also ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“In all civil
suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury, except in
cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”).
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questions of fact.”91 Although the majority was careful to emphasize that the “precise
challenge” to the constitutionality of section 2857 was not present in Irish I, it held that
the asymmetrical admission of panel findings “violated the Smiths’ constitutional right
to a jury trial for the same reasons that giving the panel findings to the jury ‘without
explanation’ violated the Irishes’ constitutional right to a jury trial”:92
When there are findings favorable to both parties, the admission of only those
findings favorable to one party distorts the jury’s fact-finding role. The findings in
favor of Smith, like the findings in favor of Hawthorne, were highly probative and
relevant to the jury’s determinations of material questions of fact.93

The judgment in favor of Dr. Hawthorne was vacated, and the case remanded to the
superior court for further proceedings.94
Justice Alexander, joined by Justice Dana, concurred in the judgment, but wrote
separately in order to argue that section 2857 can be “reasonably construed to require
submission to the jury of all unanimous findings, even when ‘the findings’ do not
support the same party.”95 Justice Alexander stated that the court has a duty to
preserve a statute’s constitutionality if it is consistent with legislative intent,96 and must
“assume that the Legislature acted in accord with due process requirements.”97 Justice
Alexander concluded his concurrence with a summary of the practical consequences
of his all-or-nothing interpretation of section 2857: “if either party wishes to offer the
answers to one or more of the unanimous findings of the panel, either all should be
admitted or none should be admitted.”98
In his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Saufley and Justice
Clifford, Justice Levy asserted that the effect of the majority opinion is to render
section 2857 unconstitutional as written rather than as applied in this particular case,
and that this constitutional analysis is “contrary to the scope and purpose of article I,
section 20” of the Maine Constitution.99 Justice Levy maintained that the absence of
similar asymmetric admissibility statutes should not influence the court’s constitutional
analysis, and that the majority’s rewriting of section 2857 “undermines the inducement
to settle nonmeritorious medical malpractice claims that the statute was intended to
achieve.”100
D. What Remains After Smith I
The majority in Smith I refused to hold that section 2857 is facially unconstitutional, and limited the scope of the constitutional violation to the application by the
superior court that permitted Dr. Hawthorne to submit only the one panel finding that

91. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 20, 892 A.2d at 438 (citing Irish I, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 664, 669).
92. Id. ¶ 22, 892 A.2d at 439.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 25, 892 A.2d at 439-40.
95. Id. ¶ 33, 892 A.2d at 441 (Alexander, J., concurring).
96. Id. ¶ 29, 892 A.2d at 440.
97. Id. ¶ 28, 892 A.2d at 440 (citing Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 14, 761 A.2d 291, 297-98
(plurality opinion)).
98. Id. ¶ 35, 892 A.2d at 441.
99. Id. ¶ 36, 892 A.2d at 441 (Levy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. ¶ 41, 892 A.2d 443.
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was favorable to her case. Although the majority opinion in no uncertain terms
attacked the substantive asymmetry created by this application, it stopped short of
declaring the statute per se unconstitutional. But while the majority went to great
lengths to explain how the statute should not be construed, it neglected to inform lower
courts how it should be construed. Justice Alexander’s concurrence provided the only
practical recommendation for the superior court on remand: “if either party wishes to
offer the answers to one or more of the unanimous findings of the panel, either all
should be admitted or none should be admitted.”101 What alternative construction of
the statute would have been permissible under the majority’s holding? If asymmetric
admissibility violates the constitution, but the statute itself does not dictate asymmetry,
then the only plausible interpretation of the statute after Smith I is the concurrence’s
all-or-nothing approach, which interprets paragraph C so as to include all of the panel
findings. Given the lack of any other alternative, it should not be surprising that Justice
Mead on remand adhered to the narrow grounds of Justice Alexander’s concurring
opinion.
Despite the concurrence’s saving construction of section 2857, the issue that Dr.
Hawthorne raised in Smith II—whether a doctor can refuse to submit all unanimous
findings when the panel unanimously found that there was either no causation or no
breach of duty—essentially blindsided the Smith I court. Neither the majority nor
concurring opinions in Smith I anticipated the evidentiary or constitutional implications
of a situation in which the doctor refuses to submit all unanimous panel findings,
despite the fact that at least one of these findings was favorable to his or her case.
IV. SMITH V. HAWTHORNE II: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PROCEDURAL ASYMMETRY
A. Proceedings on Remand to the Superior Court
In March of 2006—after the Law Court rendered its decision in Smith I—Dr.
Hawthorne filed a motion in limine on remand to the superior court.102 In this motion,
Dr. Hawthorne first requested that the jury not be advised of the panel’s finding with
respect to the claimed breach of duty, because she did not intend to introduce the
panel’s finding of proximate cause that was adverse to the Smiths.103 The motion also
requested that the jury should be advised that the panel unanimously decided that Dr.
Hawthorne was not negligent with respect to the alleged breaches that were unrelated
to the osteomyelitis at the fracture site.104 The Smiths filed a memorandum in opposition to Dr. Hawthorne’s motion, reiterating the central point of Justice Alexander’s
concurrence: “if either party wishes to offer the answers to one or more of the
unanimous findings of the panel, either all should be admitted or none should be
admitted.”105

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. ¶ 35, 892 A.2d at 441 (Alexander, J., concurring).
Appendix at 17, Smith II, 2007 ME 72, 924 A.2d 1051 (Han-06-356).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35 (citing Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 35, 892 A.2d at 441 (Alexander, J., concurring)).
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In response to these motions, Justice Mead made an advisory ruling in which he
allowed all of the panel’s findings to come in; however, he gave both parties an
opportunity to present their arguments at a hearing on May 8, 2006.106 After hearing
these arguments, Justice Mead affirmed his advisory ruling:
So I’m going to stand by my earlier ruling, and we’ll allow the findings, if you still
are committed that you want to do this, allow them to go in. Neither party has the
power to make it happen, but I think, in the current configuration, the defendant is
saying we don’t want them. If you say they go, they go.107

Mr. Greif, “cognizant this could be the briar patch gambit,” requested that all of the
findings of the screening panel be admitted.108 Justice Mead warned Mr. Greif that this
could be a double-edged sword, but Mr. Greif nevertheless decided to offer all of the
findings.109 After both sides rested, the jury returned a verdict of $120,000 for James
Smith and $20,000 for Sheryl Smith plus interest and costs.110 Dr. Hawthorne appealed
the verdict to the Law Court, contending that as the prevailing party at the screening
panel stage, she should have the ability to decide whether or not to submit these
findings.111
B. Oral Arguments Before the Law Court
Appearing before the Law Court for the third time in this case, Attorney Schelling
argued that Justice Mead erred on remand, and that the correct decision would have
been to permit Dr. Hawthorne—as the prevailing party at the screening panel stage—to
make the decision concerning admissibility of all the unanimous panel findings.112 Mr.
Schelling’s central point was that the evidentiary issue presented in this case did not
implicate any of the constitutional questions decided in Smith I, and therefore the court
should interpret Smith I as narrowly as possible in order to preserve the statutory
scheme and legislative intent.113 He attacked the plaintiff’s argument, that no party
owns the evidence of the screening panel findings, as being “too simplistic.”114 In

106. Id. at 37-38.
107. Id. at 42.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 42-43.
110. Id. at 70.
111. Brief of Appellant at 6, Smith II, 2007 ME 72, 924 A.2d 1051 (Han-06-356). Dr. Hawthorne
argued that allowing the doctor to control admissibility fulfills the legislative intent of the MHSA:
If the prevailing party is not allowed to make the decision as to whether the panel findings
are to be admitted, the stated purpose of the MHSA would be frustrated as the admission of
“split” findings by the panel to a jury does not expedite the resolution of medical liability
claims, does not provide additional helpful information to the jury and has the capacity,
especially as shown in the case at bar, to both confuse the jury and allow unnecessary and
undue emphasis to be placed on the findings of the panel.
Id.
112. Oral Arguments, Smith II, supra note 37.
113. Id. (“The majority as I see it said we will not enforce an interpretation of section 2857 that allows
one decision to come in but not the other, but it did not say that the constitution requires the admission of
both. That admission issue is not of constitutional dimension; it’s an evidentiary issue.”).
114. Id. Mr. Schelling argued that “[n]o evidence is inherently admissible. Admissible evidence is
what the legislature decrees to be admissible.” Id.
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response to the question as to whether either party would be obligated to submit
favorable findings, Mr. Schelling responded that it should be up to the party who
prevailed at the panel stage.115 Justice Alexander attacked the notion that a doctor
could be considered to prevail in the case of mixed panel findings, and insisted that
what Dr. Hawthorne was seeking in this case is a “veto power” over a panel finding of
negligence.116
Attorney Greif argued that the court should not encourage a system of procedural
asymmetry, in which the lawyer, and not the trial judge, determines the admissibility
of evidence.117 Chief Justice Saufley first asked Mr. Greif to respond to the argument
that in order for the plaintiff to submit the findings, they would have to be findings that
permit liability determinations.118 Mr. Greif responded that the plain language of the
statute did not invite such a reading.119 Justice Calkins and Chief Justice Saufley
refuted this proposition by citing section 2858’s provision that the claimant “must
release the claim or claims . . . or be subject to the admissibility of the findings.”120
Mr. Greif responded that section 2858 “no longer even makes sense as it is drafted”
because it was never amended to reflect the changes to 2857.121 Justice Calkins then
suggested that—regardless of this discrepancy—the legislative intent behind section
2858 is clear:
Justice Calkins: Except that it’s still there, and there’s no constitutional claim as I
understand it, and it says ‘subject to.’ What else does that mean other than that the
defendant is in the driver’s seat if it gets the answer that it wants on one of those two
questions?
Mr. Greif: Well I am making a constitutional argument, simply because Smith I says
that you cannot have a procedural asymmetry . . .
Chief Justice Saufley: But you wouldn’t, you would simply have the defendant
saying: “I got one finding unanimously favorable; I elect not to offer.” And at that
point, nothing goes to the jury, and it is a traditional jury trial without the

115. Id.
116. Id. The following exchange with Justice Alexander illustrates the complexity associated with
determining which party prevailed when the panel’s findings are mixed:
Justice Alexander: The legislature intended that a negligent doctor have veto power over
whether the finding of the doctor was negligence [sic] goes to the jury. That’s what you’re
saying, correct?
Mr. Schelling: No . . . .
Justice Alexander: Yes it is.
Mr. Schelling: We don’t have a negligent doctor here. We have a doctor who breached the
standard of care . . . .
Justice Alexander: The panel found the doctor negligent.
Mr Schelling: They found that she breached the standard of care. Negligence is a
combination of breach of the standard of care and causation.
Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. By “liability determinations,” Chief Justice Saufley is referring to unanimous findings favorable
to the claimant as to the questions of breach of standard of care and causation.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West 2000)).
121. Id.
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complication of the panel findings. There’s nothing asymmetrical about that at all,
and in fact is frequently wished for by claimants in these matters.122

When Justice Levy asked about the source of the ambiguity in paragraph C, Mr. Greif
responded that the “only way this court found to resolve that ambiguity constitutionally
is to say that the jury must be told the whole truth.”123 Justice Levy and Chief Justice
Saufley quickly dismissed this interpretation, and stated that the evidentiary issue
raised here was never addressed in Smith I.124 Although Mr. Greif maintained that the
court has to “look to the constitution first and foremost” before inquiring into
legislative intent, Justice Calkins revealed that Mr. Greif’s argument is more closely
tied to Maine Rule of Evidence 501125 than to a specific constitutional provision.126
C. The Decision
In a 4-2 majority opinion authored by Justice Calkins and joined by Justices
Clifford, Levy, and Chief Justice Saufley, the Law Court held that no provision of the
MHSA “requires that all of the panel’s findings be presented to the jury when the
unanimous panel is split between negligence and causation and the practitioner
objects.”127 The court rejected the Smiths’ argument that Smith I requires all unanimous findings to be submitted to the jury, and limited the holding of Smith I to the
conclusion that “if one finding is admitted, both must be admitted so that the jury’s
fact-finding role will not be distorted.”128 In its analysis of the MHSA, the court found
that the ‘subject to’ language in section 2858(2) gives the defendant practitioner the

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. After Mr. Greif offered this interpretation of the majority’s holding in Smith I, Chief Justice
Saufley and Justice Levy responded as follows:
Chief Justice Saufley: No, no.
Justice Levy: The court didn’t resolve the ambiguity constitutionally, the court resolved the
constitutional problem of asymmetrical findings, but it didn’t construe the statute as you
propose. And isn’t Mr. Schelling’s point that if in fact it is ambiguous you have to look to
legislative intent? Isn’t that how this case gets decided?
Id.
125. Maine Rule of Evidence 501 states in pertinent part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
Constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court of this state
no person has a privilege to . . . [r]efuse to disclose any matter.” ME. R. EVID. 501.
126. Oral Arguments, Smith II, supra note 37. The following exchange illustrates the court’s reaction
to Mr. Greif’s constitutional challenges in Smith II:
Justice Calkins: If nothing comes in with respect to the panel, there is no constitutional
problem, is there?
Mr. Greif: My problem is that you have a general rule of privilege which is that no party has
the right to prevent another party from offering evidence. I have a statute that says these
findings are admissible.
Chief Justice Saufley: Not if we interpret the statute to say they don’t come in under these
circumstances, then it is simply not evidence that gets presented to the jury; the same as if
the findings were not unanimous, it simply does not get to the jury. It is a completely
different constitutional question than the asymmetry looked at by the court in Smith I.
Id.
127. Smith II, 2007 ME 72, ¶ 10, 924 A.2d 1051, 1053.
128. Id. ¶ 10, 924 A.2d at 1054.
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choice “whether to make the claimant ‘subject to’ the findings” when one of the
questions is answered favorably to the defendant.129 The court also noted that this
interpretation of the MHSA is consistent with the rationale behind the establishment
of the prelitigation screening panel process to “identify claims of professional
negligence which merit compensation and to encourage early resolution of those claims
prior to the commencement of a lawsuit; and . . . to encourage early withdrawal or
dismissal of nonmeritorious claims.”130
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Clifford, Chief Justice Saufley wrote
separately to express the opinion that prelitigation screening panels have “become a
cumbersome process with unpredictable results that costs both plaintiffs and
defendants money and time in a way that was not intended by the Legislature.”131
Chief Justice Saufley focused on the fact that “[b]y the time the parties began the trial
process, the panel proceedings had already consumed more than a year and a
significant amount of the parties’ resources.”132 Furthermore, the “extensive litigation
in this case, which has now consumed eight years of the parties’ lives,” reflects how
the Law Court’s “varying interpretations of the statute have undermined predictability
in the statute’s application.”133 Chief Justice Saufley concluded her concurring opinion by suggesting that the legislature reevaluate the “current efficacy” of the MHSA’s
screening panel provisions as they have been “interpreted, amended, augmented, and
implemented since their enactment,”134 stating specifically that “it does appear that the
process no longer reflects the original legislative intent, that it has become costly and
cumbersome, and that the people of this state would benefit from a legislative
evaluation of the medical malpractice screening panel system created by the
[MHSA].”135
Justice Levy wrote separately to address the dissenting justices’ contention that a
finding for Dr. Hawthorne in this case is inconsistent with the court’s holding in Smith
I, and to distinguish the constitutional issue before the court in that case with the
question of “whether a plaintiff has the right to admit the panel findings into evidence
in a split-findings case over the objection of the defendant” raised in Smith II.136
Justice Levy specifically challenged the dissent’s conclusion that “nowhere in the law”
is there a limitation on the admission of split panel findings by citing the “subject to”
language of section 2858(2), and rejected the contention that the court’s construction
of this statute raises a constitutional problem when construed in a manner consistent
with a “legitimate state end.”137
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Silver, Justice Alexander argued that the
court’s conclusion that unanimous findings under section 2857(1)(c) are admissible
only with the doctor’s consent “is found nowhere in the law” and “violates the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. ¶ 11, 924 A.2d at 1054.
Id. ¶ 12, 924 A.2d at 1054-55 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2851(1) (West 2000)).
Id. ¶ 15, 924 A.2d at 1055 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).
Id. ¶ 16, 924 A.2d at 1055.
Id. ¶ 21, 924 A.2d at 1056.
Id. ¶ 22, 924 A.2d at 1056.
Id. ¶ 22, 924 A.2d at 1057.
Id. ¶¶ 23, 25, 924 A.2d at 1057 (Levy, J., concurring).
Id. ¶¶ 26-28, 924 A.2d at 1057-58.
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principle of fundamental fairness.”138 Justice Alexander stated that “[g]iving the
defendant doctor sole power to render the panel proceedings a nullity and prevent
admission of unanimous panel findings is contrary to the legislative purpose of the
Health Security Act.”139 After disagreeing with the majority’s finding that section
2857(1)(c) contains language that “authorize[s] defendants to decide if split unanimous
findings shall be admitted,” Justice Alexander found that the trial court on remand after
Smith I reasonably determined that both findings were admissible, and that the “most
reasonable, plain-meaning interpretation” of section 2157(1)(c) “does not discriminate
as to who can move the admission of split, unanimous findings” and “avoids any
constitutional problem.”140
V. HOW THE LAW COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED SMITH V. HAWTHORNE II
In deciding Smith II, the Law Court should have extended the same approach to
protecting the jury’s right to meaningful information concerning the screening panel
process that it applied in Smith I. By allowing the doctor to determine if split panel
findings are presented to the jury, the court introduced an unjust and unpredictable
evidentiary privilege that allows the doctor—and the doctor alone—to dictate which
evidence is and is not admissible. Maine Rule of Evidence 501 states: “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by Constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated
by the Supreme Judicial Court of this state no person has a privilege to . . . [r]efuse to
disclose any matter; or . . . prevent another . . . disclosing any matter or producing any
object or writing.”141 A technically defective statute such as section 2858 should not
have the power to supersede this general rule of privilege, regardless of legislative
intent.
The plain language of section 2858 indicates that the legislature may have
intended to treat the admissibility of panel findings differently for the claimant and
doctor:
1. Payment of Claim; Determination of Damages. If the unanimous findings of the
panel as to section 2855, subsections 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, the person
accused of professional negligence must promptly enter into negotiations to pay the
claim or admit liability. If liability is admitted, the claim may be submitted to the
panel, upon agreement of the claimant and person accused, for determination of
damages. If suit is brought to enforce the claim, the findings of the panel are
admissible as provided in section 2857.
2. Release of Claim Without Payment. If the unanimous findings of the panel as to
either section 2855, subsection 1 or 2, are in the negative, the claimant must release
the claim or claims based on the findings without payment or be subject to the
admissibility of those findings under section 2857, subsection 1, paragraph B.142

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. ¶ 36, 924 A.2d at 1059 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 41, 924 A.2d at 1060.
Id. ¶ 42, 924 A.2d at 1060-61.
ME. R. EVID. 501(2)(4).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West 2000) (emphasis added).

226

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

Upon first glance, it may seem as if the legislature’s disparate treatment of the findings
with respect to the claimant and the doctor should decide the admissibility question in
Smith II. The statute clearly provides that a claimant who fails to receive a favorable
finding as to breach of duty or causation shall be “subject to the admissibility of those
findings,” whereas the findings “are admissible” if the doctor loses on both points. But
as Mr. Greif noted in his arguments to the Law Court, section 2858 “no longer even
makes sense as it is drafted.”143 According to the plain language of section 2858, if the
findings of the panel are unanimous and unfavorable to the claimant, the claimant will
be subject to the admissibility of those findings under section 2857, subsection 1,
paragraph B, which refers to the situation in which the claimant prevails on breach of
duty and causation.144 If section 2858 had been amended to reflect the 1999
amendments to section 2857, one could not assume that the choice of language in
subsections 1 and 2—and the correspondingly disparate treatment of the findings’
admissibility—was unintentional or carelessly chosen. In light of this legislative
oversight, however, all that remains is a reading of sections 2857 and 2858 in pari
materia that is patently ambiguous.
As the Law Court stated in a footnote in Irish II, “[t]he 1999 revision of section
2857(1) . . . may necessitate development of new jurisprudence regarding use of
unanimous panel findings.”145 There is no clear way to determine whether the
legislature’s failure to respond to this call by overlooking section 2858 in its 1999
amendments was simply a technical glitch, or a more fundamental failure to provide
a coherent legislative response to the constitutional challenges raised in Irish I.
Furthermore, it would be an anachronism to apply the legislative intent of section
2858—enacted in 1985—to the interpretation of the post-Irish I section 2857—
amended in 1999. When section 2858 was originally enacted, the legislature intended
that the panel findings under section 2857 be introduced at a subsequent trial “without
explanation.” After this language was omitted in the wake of the constitutional
challenge upheld in Irish I, the legislative intent from the 1985 enactment of section
2858 no longer provides any meaningful insight on the interpretation of section 2857.
As Justice Alexander explained in his concurring opinion in Smith I, “[w]hen a
statute is ambiguous, we must look beyond the words of the statute to construe its
meaning, considering the statute’s history, underlying policy, our rules of construction,
and other extrinsic factors to ascertain legislative intent.”146 There is no clear evidence

143. Oral Arguments, Smith II, supra note 37.
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2858 (West 2000).
145. Irish II, 2000 ME 2, ¶ 6 n.1, 743 A.2d 736, 737 n.1.
146. Smith I, 2006 ME 16, ¶ 30, 892 A.2d 433, 440 (Alexander, J., concurring). Admittedly, Justice
Alexander did not reach the question of section 2857’s ambiguity without first presenting Rideout’s
deferential standard: “[b]ecause we must assume that the Legislature acted in accord with due process
requirements, if we can reasonably interpret a statute as satisfying those constitutional requirements, we
must read it in such a way, notwithstanding other possible unconstitutional interpretations of the same
statute.” Id. ¶ 28, 892 A.2d at 440 (quoting Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 14, 761 A.2d 291, 29798 (plurality opinion)). However, the well-established assumption of legislative consistency with due
process requirements explicated in Rideout should not necessarily dictate the constitutionality of a statute
that has so often lent itself to unconstitutional applications. If the Law Court has so frequently found
constitutional defects in various applications of the statute, and Rideout’s deferential standard applies, then
one must assume that the legislature envisioned—but never explicated—an application of the statute that
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in the history of the MHSA that the legislature intended to provide an evidentiary
advantage for the doctor in the event of mixed panel findings.
The legislative history of section 2857 suggests that the type of evidentiary
discretion sought by Dr. Hawthorne in this case would produce a procedural advantage
for the doctor that the legislature never envisioned. There would have been no need
for the legislature to consistently amend, repeal, and fine-tune different versions of
section 2857 if the doctor was considered to have the final say as to the admissibility
of the panel findings. In the amendments to the 1999 Act to Provide Fairness to
Victims of Medical Malpractice,147 the Senate removed the Judiciary Committee’s
amendment which stated that “the findings are admissible only against the claimant,”148
and added what would become paragraph B to provide for the admissibility of panel
findings against the doctor.149 The summary which accompanied these amendments
stated that the new version “adds language to retain the admissibility of all unanimous
panel findings.”150 There is nothing in the legislative history of section 2857 to support
the proposition that the party who prevailed at the screening party stage would be able
to subsequently control the admissibility of the unanimous findings.
The underlying policy of the MHSA also seems incompatible with the idea that
the doctor should dictate admissibility of mixed findings. The express purpose of the
screening panel process, as outlined in section 2851, is to “identify claims of professional negligence and to encourage early withdrawal or dismissal of nonmeritorious
claims.”151 The legislative history of section 2857 illustrates a consistent attempt to
retain the incentive for a claimant to abandon his or her claim when the screening panel
has not answered the questions of breach of duty and causation in his or her favor.152
The Law Court in Smith II should have retained the statutorily-prescribed incentive for
a claimant to abandon non-meritorious claims by holding that the jury needs to hear all
unanimous panel findings upon motion by either party.
Furthermore, the mandatory admission of all unanimous panel findings would
create an incentive for abandoning non-meritorious claims that is far stronger than the
threat of procedural asymmetry. If it is true that a doctor is considered to prevail at the
screening panel stage when the claimant fails to meet his burden of proof as to standard
of care and causation, then mandatory admission would simply convey the underlying
basis for this no liability finding to a jury. What better incentive would there be for
such a plaintiff to abandon his claim if “the findings” in paragraph C was interpreted
to include all the findings of the screening panel, or if the legislature amended section

is consistent with due process requirements. It is unclear how the process of inferring what particular
application of the statute is consistent with legislative intent is any different than the process one would
apply in interpreting an ambiguous statute.
147. L.D. 1325 (119th Legis. 1999).
148. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1325, No. S-352 (119th Legis. 1999).
149. Sen. Amend. A to Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1325, No. S-381 (119th Legis. 1999).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2851 (West 2000).
152. See, e.g., Sen. Amend. A to Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1325, No. S-381 (119th Legis. 1999). The
Senate amendment’s new paragraph B provided for the admissibility of “the findings” against the person
accused of professional negligence, and the accompanying summary stated that this change “add[ed]
language to retain the admissibility of all panel findings.” Id.
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2857 so as to clarify that all of the panel findings—both unanimous and nonunanimous—are admissible against either party in a subsequent trial?
VI. HOW THE MAINE LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND SECTIONS 2857 AND 2858
There is no shortage of options facing the Maine Legislature after Smith I and II.
It may decide—on the basis of the majority opinions in Smith I and II—that section
2857 is not unconstitutional as written, and therefore that the screening panel process
as outlined in sections 2851 through 2859 requires no amendments whatsoever.
However, even the most deferential reading of these statutes cannot overlook the
nonsensical reference in section 2858, subsection 2 to the pre-1999 version of section
2857. At the very least, section 2858, subsection 2 needs to be amended to refer to
2857, subsection 1, paragraph C instead of paragraph B. It is unlikely that this de
minimis fine-tuning of the statutory language will be sufficient to remedy the
underlying constitutional and evidentiary defects that have been raised in Smith I and
II, or that have yet to be addressed by the Law Court.
The Maine Legislature could choose to amend section 2857 by following the
statutory schemes of New Mexico and Montana, which provide that the findings of the
screening panel are inadmissible at a subsequent trial.153 This option, however, seems
to undermine the legislative intent explicated in section 2851 to “identify claims of
professional negligence which merit compensation . . . and to encourage early
withdrawal or dismissal of nonmeritorious claims.”154 In a jurisdiction where no
screening panel findings are admissible, each malpractice claimant would begin each
trial with a tabula rasa, completely free of any prejudicial effect that the panel findings
might have on the jury. The most significant problem with this legislative scheme is
that it completely disarms the incentive-creating function of the screening panel. A
claimant who has lost on the three issues of breach of duty, causation, and comparative
negligence would be free to proceed to trial under the same set of facts, and would face
no statutory disincentives for doing so.
A third option would be for the Maine Legislature to adopt the approach of those
jurisdictions that allow for the entire screening panel report to be admitted on motion
by either party, regardless of who prevailed and whether or not these findings were
unanimous. Many other states with similar prelitigation screening panel statutes provide that the entire screening panel report shall be admissible at a later trial. Kansas
and Nebraska’s statutes specify that the panel’s report is admissible in any subsequent
court action, provided that the report is not conclusive and that any member of the
panel can be cross-examined.155 Delaware’s statute provides that the report of the

153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-704(2) (2005) (providing that the decision, reasoning, and basis of the
panel’s decision are inadmissible at a subsequent trial); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-20 (West 2006) (providing
that the report of the medical malpractice panel “shall not be admissible as evidence in any action
subsequently brought in a court of law”).
154. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2851(1) (West 2000).
155. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844 (2006) (“The report or any minority report of the medical review panel
shall be admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but
such report shall not be conclusive and either party shall have the right to call any member of the medical
review panel as a witness.”); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4904 (2006) (“The written report of the
screening panel shall be admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and either party may subpoena any
and all members of the panel as witnesses for examination relating to the issues at trial.”).

2008]

ADMISSIBILITY OF SCREENING PANEL FINDINGS

229

screening panel is admissible as prima facie evidence in a subsequent trial, although
the panel is only charged with determining whether there was a breach in the standard
of care and not causation.156 Massachusetts law provides for a mandatory submission
of claims to a medical malpractice tribunal and states that “the decision of the tribunal
shall be admissible as evidence at a trial,” regardless of the unanimity of the findings
or their favorability to either party.157
In the case of a doctor who has unanimously prevailed on either the issue of
breach of duty or causation, the admission of the entire screening panel report should
not have any effect on the legislative intent to create incentives for abandoning nonmeritorious claims. After Smith I, a doctor is not constitutionally permitted to submit
only that question favorable to his or her case; what difference, then, would the
admission of the entire report have in a case such as Dr. Hawthorne’s, in which one
unanimous finding was favorable to her case, and the other was unfavorable?
Amending section 2857 to require that the entire screening panel report be admissible
would simply extend the scope of admissibility to include non-unanimous findings,
which are not completely devoid of an incentive-creating function.
Section 2857 currently rests on the flawed assumption that disincentives for
doctors and claimants need to be generated by manipulating the rules of admissibility
so as to favor one party over the other at a subsequent trial. As Smith I revealed,
however, at least one application of this admissibility disincentive is constitutionally
defective. And as Smith II reveals, the evidentiary question of which party should
control the admissibility of mixed unanimous panel findings is not addressed in section
2857, and can only be answered by attempting to infer legislative intent from an
inaccurately drafted section 2858. But manipulating the admissibility of panel findings
is not the only way to generate incentives for settlement or abandonment of nonmeritorious claims. An equally powerful incentive could be created by requiring the
party who unanimously ‘lost’ at the screening panel to pay the other’s reasonable
expert and attorneys’ fees at a subsequent trial. Section 2858 could be amended to
read:
1. PAYMENT OF CLAIM; DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES. If the unanimous
findings of the panel as to section 2855, subsections 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, the
person accused of professional negligence must promptly enter into negotiations to

156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6811 (2007). The Delaware statute requires that the panel make one or
more of the following findings:
(1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to
comply with the appropriate standard of care;
(2) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed
to meet the applicable standard of care;
(3) There is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for
consideration by the Court or jury, which issue of fact shall be identified in the
opinion; or
(4) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor in the resultant damages, and if so,
whether the plaintiff suffered:
a.
Any disability and the extent and duration of the disability; and
b. Any permanent impairment and the percentage of the impairment.
Id.
157. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
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pay the claim or admit liability. If liability is admitted, the claim may be submitted
to the panel, upon agreement of the claimant and person accused, for determination
of damages. If suit is brought to enforce the claim and the court finds in favor of the
claimant at a subsequent trial, the findings of the panel are admissible as provided in
section 2857. court shall assess fees and expenses of counsel and experts for the
respective parties, in amounts the court finds equitable, against the person accused of
professional negligence. If suit is brought to enforce the claim, and the court finds
in favor of the person accused of professional negligence at a subsequent trial, fees
and expenses of counsel and experts shall be assessed against the respective parties.
2. RELEASE OF CLAIM WITHOUT PAYMENT. If the unanimous findings of the
panel as to either section 2855, subsection 1 or 2, are in the negative, the claimant
must release the claim or claims based on the findings without payment or be subject
to the admissibility of those findings under section 2857, subsection 1, paragraph B
bring suit to enforce the claim. If suit is brought to enforce the claim and the court
finds in favor of the person accused of professional negligence at a subsequent trial,
the court shall assess fees and expenses of counsel and experts for the respective
parties, in amounts the court finds equitable, against the claimant. If suit is brought
to enforce the claim, and the court finds in favor of the claimant at a subsequent trial,
fees and expenses of counsel and experts shall be assessed against the respective
parties. 158

These amendments would not only provide an independent incentive for settlements
and dismissals, but would also supplement the incentives created by the mandatory
admission of the entire screening panel report as mandated by the newly-amended
subsection 1 of section 2857:
1. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE PANEL CONFIDENTIAL. Except as provided in this
section and section 2858, all proceedings before the panel, including its final
determinations, must be treated in every respect as private and confidential by the
panel and the parties to the claim.
A. The findings and other writings of the panel other than the malpractice decree
mandated by paragraph B of this subsection and any evidence and statements made

158. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1332 (West 2005) (allowing the court to “assess
the fees and expenses of counsel and experts for the respective parties, in amounts the court finds equitable”
against either a corporation or shareholder in a stock appraisal proceeding); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)
(allowing the court, “in its discretion” and under certain limited circumstances, to allow the prevailing party
other than the United States reasonable attorney’s costs and expert fees); FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (“If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer.”). The allocation of fees outlined in this proposed amendment is akin
to the British Rule, which numerous scholars have championed as a means of encouraging settlements. See,
e.g., Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort-Litigation: The Promise of
Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 321 (2005) (finding that an ideal fee-shifting rule “would
discourage plaintiffs from carrying weak claims to a jury” and “would reduce the potential for irrational
jury verdicts or excessive awards by imposing substantial financial risk on parties who decline to settle their
cases before judgment”); Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency
Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2186 (1992) (finding that the cost
of cases tried under the British Rule tend to be more expensive, and that these higher costs “will usually
foster settlement despite the inhibitory impact of legal costs ‘discounted’ due to the probability of fee
recovery if successful”).
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by a party or a party's representative during a panel hearing are not admissible and
may not otherwise be submitted or used for any purpose in a subsequent court action
and may not be publicly disclosed, except that:
1. Any testimony or writings made under oath may be used in subsequent proceedings
for purposes of impeachment; and
2. The party who made the statement or presented the evidence may agree to the
submission, use or disclosure of that statement or evidence.
B. If the panel findings as to both the questions under section 2855, subsection 1,
paragraphs A and B are unanimous and unfavorable to the person accused of
professional negligence, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court action
for professional negligence against that person by the claimant based on the same set
of facts upon which the notice of claim was filed.
B. The panel shall summarize its findings as to the questions under section 2855,
subsection 1, paragraphs A, B, and C in a malpractice decree, which shall be
admissible upon motion by either party in any subsequent court action for
professional negligence based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of claim
was filed. The malpractice decree shall be admissible in its entirety without regard
to the unanimity of the panel’s findings as to any question or questions under section
2855, subsection 1, paragraphs A, B, and C. The malpractice decree shall not be
conclusive evidence of liability or the lack thereof.
C. If the panel findings as to any question under section 2855 are unanimous and
unfavorable to the claimant, the findings are admissible in any subsequent court
action for professional negligence against the person accused of professional
negligence by the claimant based on the same set of facts upon which the notice of
claim was filed.
C. No panel member may be asked or compelled to testify at a subsequent court
action concerning the deliberations, discussions, findings, or expert testimony or
opinions expressed during the panel hearing.
The confidentiality provisions of this section do not apply if the findings were
influenced by fraud.

While this newly amended version of section 2857 undoubtedly limits the scope
of the confidentiality provisions currently in force, it does not entirely invalidate them.
The deliberations of the panel will still be kept confidential; it is only the panel’s
malpractice decree that will become admissible at a later trial. Neither party will be
allowed to call any panel member to the stand, although this statute would leave the
door open for the calling of expert witnesses who may have testified before the panel.
The confidentiality provisions of section 2857 have already been substantially
weakened by the court’s holding in Smith I; no longer can all the findings of the panel
be kept confidential except for the one finding favorable to the doctor. In light of the
constitutional defect of this interpretation revealed by Smith I, what more would this
amended version of section 2857 do other than expand the scope of admissibility at a
subsequent trial to include non-unanimous findings?
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As it is currently drafted, section 2857 relies on the misconception that only
unanimous panel findings are effective in creating disincentives for the pursuit of nonmeritorious claims. Although neither Smith I nor Smith II addressed the admissibility
of non-unanimous findings, the Law Court will inevitably face a variety of appeals
from superior court decisions that refused to allow non-unanimous findings in favor
of either party before the jury. The iterations of potential constitutional challenges to
these admissions decisions are almost overwhelming in scope. If, for example, a panel
found 2 to 1 in favor of the claimant on breach of duty and causation, and 3 to 0 in
favor of the doctor on comparative negligence, the plain language of section 2857
seems to suggest that none of these findings will be admissible.159 If a doctor prevails
2-1 on breach of duty, causation, and comparative negligence, what current statutory
mechanism exists for getting those findings before a jury? The disincentives that are
generated in these cases are inconsistent with the legislative intent to convey the
panel’s underlying findings to the jury so as to promote settlements and dismissals
prior to trial.
Permitting the admissibility of the entire malpractice decree would allow the
findings to speak for themselves and generate their own incentives for abandoning a
non-meritorious claim or defense. The legislature could simultaneously distance itself
from the constitutional and evidentiary challenges raised in Smith I and II, and create
an evidentiary approach to the admissibility of panel findings upon which the courts
and both sides of the Maine bar could consistently rely.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the midst of a nationwide malpractice crisis in the 1970s, the Pomeroy
Commission recommended that voluntary professional malpractice advisory panels be
established in order to “(1) prevent, where possible, the filing of court actions against
physicians for professional malpractice in situations where the facts do not allow at
least a reasonable inference of malpractice[, and] (2) to make possible the fair and
equitable disposition of such claims against physicians as are, or reasonably may be,
well founded.”160 The legislature embraced these underlying purposes, and the efficacy
of this voluntary system in mitigating the effects of Maine’s malpractice crisis
eventually led to the enactment of a mandatory prelitigation screening panel process.
It soon became clear that in adopting this mandatory screening panel process, the
legislature may not have anticipated section 2857’s vulnerability to various
constitutional challenges. In Irish I, the Law Court held that section 2857’s “without
comment” provision violated the claimant’s right to a jury trial by depriving the factfinder of information necessary to render a fair verdict. The legislature responded by
removing the “without comment” provisions, but this amendment was insufficient to
forestall further constitutional challenges. In Smith I, a malpractice claimant
challenged an application of section 2857 which allowed the doctor to submit only the
one unanimous finding favorable to his or her case when there was also a unanimous

159. Note that section 2857 as currently drafted provides no mechanism for the admissibility of a
unanimous finding in favor of the claimant in this particular case, or when either the question of breach of
duty or causation is answered in favor of the doctor. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2857 (West 2000).
160. Pomeroy Report, supra note 17, at 24.
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unfavorable finding. The Law Court agreed that the application of the statute in this
case denied the Smiths their right to a jury trial under the Maine Constitution, but
refused to hold that the statute is per se unconstitutional.
In Smith II, Dr. Hawthorne asserted that the party who prevailed at the panel stage
with respect to his or her particular burden of proof should be able to control the
admissibility of the panel’s findings at a subsequent trial. By inferring legislative
intent from the “subject to” language in section 2858(2), a majority of the Law Court
held that the doctor should control the admissibility of mixed panel findings when one
question has been answered favorably to the defendant. However, the question
remains whether section 2858, which was never amended to reflect the legislature’s
1999 changes to section 2857, should be dispositive of any question relating to
legislative intent when so much of this intent was declared constitutionally deficient
in Irish I. Although the questions raised in Smith II are not of the same constitutional
dimension as in Smith I, the Law Court should nevertheless have extended the same
protections of the jury’s right to meaningful information that it applied in Smith I.
In order to remedy the current defects of section 2857, the Maine Legislature must
first abandon the misconception that non-unanimous panel findings would be
ineffective in generating incentives for settlement or the abandonment of nonmeritorious claims. It must then consider the possibility of adding supplemental
incentives in the form of an award of reasonable expert and attorneys’ fees, assessed
against the party who unanimously lost at the screening panel and then loses again at
a subsequent trial. The threat of these fees in conjunction with the admissibility of the
entire malpractice decree should be more than sufficient in deterring the pursuit of a
claim or a defense that the panel unanimously finds to have no merit. In the situation
where the panel’s finding was not unanimous on all questions, it can be argued that this
is not really a conclusive statement by the panel one way or the other, and that one of
the parties has at least raised a question that merits litigation before a court of
competent jurisdiction. A panel finding of 2 to 1 as to any question under section 2858
would simply be a statement that more fact-finding is necessary to make a conclusive
determination, which is not inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the screening
panel process to promote pretrial settlements and dismissals.
The Law Court may have to this point been able to salvage a narrow constitutional
application of sections 2857 and 2858, but it is unlikely that the current version of
these statutes will be able to withstand any further constitutional challenges. The
legislature can help to streamline medical malpractice litigation in Maine by codifying
a consistent and predictable evidentiary rule that would allow for the admissibility of
the entire screening panel malpractice decree and the assessment of reasonable expert
and attorneys’ fees against the party who unanimously loses at the screening panel
stage, refuses to abandon his claim, and then loses at a subsequent trial. Minor, nonintrusive amendments may provide temporary relief, but until the legislature
reappraises the basic assumptions underlying sections 2857 and 2858, the
constitutional infirmity of admissibility-oriented disincentives will remain a problem
long after Smith I and II have been forgotten.

